

Philosophy and Poetry (Fichte and Baratashvili)

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Abstract:

As a result of the semantic research carried out in the 20th century, it was found that 'me' is an undefined word. Namely, the author of the original semantic theory, A. Wierzbicka aimed to identify those semantic units ('primitives') which are in themselves unexplained (intuitively clear meaning) and through which any word or expression can be defined. One such 'primitive' is 'me'. Thus, the semantics of 'I' cannot be explained through other words (of course, here we mean psychological, philosophical, etc. explanations), i.e. It has a clear meaning in itself – 'I am me' or 'I am me'. But 'I am I' is the first (of three) basic provisions of that philosophical concept, which, V. According to Schlegel, it gave impetus to the origin of romanticism. We refer to Johann Gottlieb Fichte's 'General Doctrine of Science'. This provision of Fichte's theoretical system means the self-identity of 'I' in the logical aspect, and in the semantic aspect (although the philosopher will not ask this question) – that 'I' is an indefinable concept. Fichte's concept of personality, which found expression in romanticism, is already meant here. According to this statement, the logical center of the universe is 'I', that is, the universe is logically based in 'I', as a 'subject'.

As a result of a special analysis, the article concludes that the poetic image of 'I' in the poetry of Georgian romanticists (and, especially, N. Baratashvili) was formed in accordance with the same principles that were the basis for the development of the concept of 'I' in Fichte's philosophical system.

Keywords: Romanticism, Concept of "I", Poetics of Doubles, Fichte, Baratashvili

It is recognized that romanticism developed a new concept of personality and, in particular, revealed all the contradictions and complexity of the human spiritual world. In romantic literature, "I" of a person was presented as a certain set (several "I"s), which laid the foundation for the so-called Establishing the poetics of 'doubles'. Opposing views are also expressed. So, for example, S.S. Averintsev asks: "How should we approach the human inner world – as an open and multi-component structure or as a closed, self-sufficient and indivisible monad?" and concludes: "The second kind of approach ... arose very late and was used only in a narrow circle of literary facts. The great literary eras of the past were inspired by other concepts"(Averintsev, 1972, p. 235). To confirm his point of view, the researcher cites appropriate arguments from such materials as mythology, ancient Greek literature, medieval writing, realistic art of the 19th century, and, finally, examines M.M. Bakhtin's provision: a person never matches himself. We cannot apply the sameness formula to it: A is A. Thus, according to Averintsev, the concept of personality, the origin of which is dated to the era of romanticism, functioned much earlier in literature. However, it is obvious that the romantic concept of the person is very specific and combines both approaches: the person is a single "monad" in relation to the world; On the other hand, it is an 'open structure' when considered by itself, isolated from this world.

What is the semantics of the word "I"? Bertrand Russell assigned "I" to the number of "egocentric words" whose meaning is determined only by the speaker's position in time and space (Russell, 1948, p.103). As a result of the semantic research carried out in the 20th century, it was found that "I" is an undefined word. Namely, the author of the original semantic theory, A. Wierzbicka aimed to identify those semantic units ("primitives") which are in themselves unexplained and through which any word or expression can be defined. The scientist proved that one of such "primitives" is "I". Thus, the semantics of "I" cannot be explained through other words (of course, here we mean psychological, philosophical, etc. explanations), i.e. it has a clear meaning in itself – "I" is "I" or "I am I". But "I am I" is the first (of three) basic provisions of that philosophical concept, which, according to F.Schlegel, it gave impetus to the origin of romanticism. We refer to Johann Gottlieb Fichte's "Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge". First statement of Fichte's theoretical system means the self-identity of "I" in the logical aspect, and in the semantic aspect (although the philosopher will not ask this question) – that "I" is an undefined concept.

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Wierzbicka's theory aims to prove that thinking is based on elementary, self-evident concepts (including the concept of 'I'). Therefore, thinking is presented as a semantically based process. Similarly, with Fichte, the concept of the impersonal (indefinable), self-identical 'I' is the logical basis of philosophical doctrine. About such "dotted" concepts V.S. Bibler observes: *"An object becomes an argument for more complex objects and processes only if this object can be understood as a unit ... by virtue of the self-sufficient necessity of its own existence"* (Bibler, 1975, p. 205). This kind of self-sufficient "objec" is "I" both in Wierzbicka's theory and in Fichte's system. In both cases, the non-specificity (ambiguity) of "I" serves the purpose of cognition and explanation of "more complex objects" (with Wierzbicka – words and expressions, and with Fichte, "not-I").

Fichte urges the reader: *"reach into yourself, remove your gaze from everything that surrounds you, and direct it to yourself"* (Fichte, 1993, p. 448). "He who realizes his own freedom and independence from the environment ... does not need things to support his "I", nor can he benefit from things, because they dilute and undermine this independence" (ibid., 460). In this discussion of Fichte, the concept of personality, which found expression in romanticism, is already implied. Indeed, the person's environment is, first of all, his closest social environment, i.e. "you". In order to achieve "freedom and independence", it is necessary to "look away" from this "you", to separate from it. In addition, "you" cannot disappear without a trace. It loses its function (as the closest social environment of a person), it is internalized, it moves within the framework of 'I' and becomes its constituent component. A "multi-component" structure of a person is formed, and a social vacuum surrounds it. It is conceivable that these are the reasons for the popularity of "internal doubles" or, in general, "poetics of doubles" and the motif of loneliness in romanticism (whether the romantics or Fichte himself were aware of it, or not).

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Let's go back to the first statement of Fichte's doctrine – "I am I". According to this statement, the logical center of the universe is 'I', that is, the universe is logically based in 'I', as a 'subject'. This means that there are no other "things", "environment". Accordingly, a way of depicting the world is

established in romantic literature, which presents its mystery (uncharacteristic). The landscape is mostly nocturnal, hidden in the twilight. Such is Gr. Orbeliani's "Evening Greeting". In N. Baratashvili's poems – "The Color of the Sky" and "Sunset for Mtatsminda" – the world is understood as "covered in darkness", a qualitatively indeterminate given. Individual objects seem to disappear in it, they are imperceptible. Baratashvili also often refers to the free predication of objects and events, as if there were no specific objects with solid characteristics. In Al. Chavchavadze's and Gr. Orbelian's poetry, the grotesque image of the world is based on the principle of "averting the gaze" from the world (deforming the image of the world). Fichte calls the first provision of his doctrine "completely unconditioned". This is a self-evident statement, which differs from the second statement by this sign: "I" is not equal to "not-I". The second statement, according to the definition of the philosopher, is "due to its content", i.e. postulating "I" inevitably implies postulating "not-I" as well. However, according to the third statement ('I' is equal to 'I' and 'not-I'), the finite 'I' and 'not-I' are united within the same consciousness. What is the rationale that led Fichte to the third statement? The goal and final task of the German philosopher is to know the essence of 'I', to define it as a concept. But how should we know 'I', if it has no predicates, is self-evident and unexplained? Of course, this is possible only through contrasting it with another concept. And the latter must necessarily be ... again 'I', but different from the first 'I', which is permissible only when the first 'I' and the second 'I' ('not-I', 'you') are meant within the same consciousness. Indeed, the process of forming a concept necessarily involves at least two interchangeable subjects. Obviously, these two (or more) things are not absolutely identical, but they have essential uniform characteristics that necessarily belong to these things and correspond to their essence. Thus, since as a result of internalization "something" ('you') becomes a component of the same consciousness that includes "I", this "not-I" is also a variety of "I", its difference. The generalization of the invariant of 'me' and "not-I" allows the concept of "me" to be formed.

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In N. Baratashvili's poetry, the characteristic features of "poetics of double" are evident. For example, in "Merani", the double of the lyrical hero is Merani, as a kind of "not-I". In fact, the lyrical hero is passive here, and activity, the ability to act, is attributed to Merani, who leads the lyrical hero

to the “border” of fate. The main motive of this poem is the longing for freedom, which is equivalent to liberation from all (social or other) ties. Emancipation from the material environment, according to the artistic concept of the poem (exactly as Fichte thought), will lead to the liberation of consciousness, and in such conditions, “I” will be able to “turn its gaze towards itself” and know the latter through its “not-I”. “Mysterious voice” is an active inner voice (inner “not-I”), which is subject to the hero, his thoughts and his whole life. Such is “Evil Spirit”, whose lyrical hero in the very first chapter calls his “leader”, his “disturber of mind and life” an inner double (that the evil spirit is an inner double is indicated by the words “Get out of me”). That's why it can be said that in Baratashvili's work, “not-I” is always active, and “I” is inactive, passive.

Is this understanding of “I” and “other” accidental? Or is it due to the specifics of the romantic outlook? Let's see how Fichte defines the relationship between `I' and “other” while explaining the third statement of his system. The philosopher emphasizes that action and reality are concepts with identical content (what is capable of action is real, and vice versa). The self-awareness of the `I' is an action (a certain act), and thus the `I' is real. On the other hand, “I” will know itself through “not-I”, that is, “not-I” must define (and definition is an action) “I”. Therefore, “not-I” is also real; This is a logical contradiction, because “I” and “not-I”, as mutually opposite conditions, should not be characterized by the same sign. In order to remove this contradiction, Fichte attributes to `I' (which is defined by “not-I”) the opposite state of action – passive state. In addition, “not-I” has no reality, if “I” is not in a passive state and in the case when reality is attributed to “not-I”, this reality is illusory. The concordance of Baratashvili's artistic thinking and Fichte's philosophical statements does not end with the fact that `I' in the works of the Georgian romanticist is passive (is in a passive state), unlike “not-I”.

In “Merani” `I' (the subject of speech) is real – as much as the text through which `I' expresses itself is real. “not-“ is not real, because it does not have any object denotation (Merani refers not to “horse”, but to internal “not-I”) and, in addition, it does not represent the subject of speech. For the same reason, the lyrical hero (as “I”) is real in all of Baratashvili's works, which reflected the lyrical hero's inner duality, and, therefore, his “not-I” is not real. In such works as “Evening at Mtatsminda” and “Thought on the Riverside of Mtkvari” (where the author refers to the free predication of events) the first expressed point of view is real, which is confirmed by the reality of the text, its presence. The second (opposite) point of view should

be attributed to “not-I” (it is significant that it is always expressed in the last stanza of the work).

In AL. Chavchavadze's work, where carnival motifs and romantic grotesque poetics found expression, the external doubling of the personality appears. His carnival mask is a kind of variation of “not-I” because it replaces (covers) the human face. In such a case, a person has two faces: visible and invisible, social and individual, true and untrue, real and unreal. The true face, as invisible, is passive. A person is perceived only according to his mask. In this sense, “I” is in a state of passion, while “not-I” is active (referring to the social role that a mask imposes on a person in a carnival situation). Also, a face covered with a mask is real (because it is true), and a mask is unreal (characterized by an apparent reality).

In Gr.Orbeliani's work “not-I” is embodied in the faces of carnival false kings. Their unreality is expressed in the fact that they are false kings and after the end of the carnival, they will move into the “death phase”, that is, they will become “slaves” again. It should be noted that Gr. Orbeliani, as well as. In Chavchavadze's work, the opposition of “I” and “not-I” is revealed when we consider the set of works of each of them as a single text. Based on the above, we can conclude that the poetic image of `I` in the poetry of Georgian romanticists (and, especially, N. Baratashvili) was formed in accordance with the same principles that were the basis for the development of the concept of `I` in Fichte's philosophical system.

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